Introduction

Chevron deference might sound like a complicated legal term, but it’s a concept that has played a huge role in how federal agencies like the DEA operate. It all started with a Supreme Court case in 1984, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. In simple terms, Chevron deference means that if a law is vague or ambiguous, courts should defer to the agency’s interpretation of that law, as long as the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.

What is Chevron Deference?

This principle emerged from a dispute involving the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Supreme Court's decision established a two-step process: first, see if the law is clear. If it’s not, and the law is ambiguous, then the agency’s interpretation should stand if it’s reasonable. This gave agencies a lot of flexibility to interpret laws and adapt to new situations.

Impact of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo

However, things took a turn recently with the case of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. The Supreme Court revisited and ultimately overturned Chevron deference in this case. It all started with a regulation issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service, which was challenged and led to the court deciding that the agency had overstepped its authority. This decision means that courts will no longer automatically defer to agencies' interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Instead, courts will independently interpret these statutes, which could lead to stricter judicial scrutiny of agency actions.

How Chevron Deference Helped the DEA

Now, let’s look at how Chevron deference has helped the DEA in the past. In Gonzales v. Oregon (2006), the Supreme Court had to decide whether the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) allowed the DEA to prohibit doctors from prescribing drugs for physician-assisted suicide, which was permitted by Oregon law. Although the court ruled against the DEA, this case highlighted how crucial agency interpretation can be in complex legal landscapes.

Another example is Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA (1994). Here, the DEA’s decision to classify marijuana as a Schedule I substance was upheld, with the court deferring to the agency’s expertise in interpreting scientific and medical factors under the CSA. Similarly, in Touby v. United States (1991), the Supreme Court upheld the DEA’s authority to temporarily schedule substances to prevent public health risks, relying on the agency’s interpretation of its statutory powers.

In United States v. Chapman (2012), the DEA’s emergency scheduling of synthetic cannabinoids was upheld, with the court deferring to the agency’s judgment on public health risks. And in Americans for Safe Access v. DEA (2013), the court upheld the DEA’s decision to deny a petition to reschedule marijuana, again deferring to the agency’s interpretation of the CSA.

Future Impacts on the DEA

With Chevron deference no longer in play, what can we expect for the DEA? The DEA will face increased judicial scrutiny, as courts will now independently interpret ambiguous statutes rather than deferring to the agency’s expertise. This could lead to more litigation, as parties challenge the DEA’s interpretations more frequently. We might also see the DEA becoming more conservative in its rulemaking, relying on clearer statutory mandates to avoid legal challenges.

Major policy initiatives that depend on broad interpretations of ambiguous statutes could face hurdles, and the DEA might need to work more closely with Congress to ensure its actions have a solid legal basis. This new landscape will likely increase the administrative burden on the DEA, requiring more detailed justifications for its actions to withstand legal scrutiny. Finally, the DEA’s enforcement actions could be questioned more often, potentially leading to changes in how it classifies and regulates controlled substances.

Impact on Physicians

The overturning of Chevron deference also significantly impacts physicians charged with unlawful distribution under 21 USC 841 and the interpretation of 21 CFR 1306.04. These statutes make it unlawful for physicians to prescribe controlled substances outside the scope of professional practice or not for a legitimate medical purpose. Historically, the DEA has had broad discretion in interpreting these terms.

For instance, in United States v. Moore (1975), the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a physician for distributing controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice, emphasizing that registered physicians can be prosecuted under 21 USC 841 when their activities fall outside professional norms.

With the end of Chevron deference, courts will no longer defer to the DEA’s interpretation of what constitutes “legitimate medical purpose” and “usual course of professional practice.” This could lead to several significant changes:

• Stricter Judicial Scrutiny: Courts will independently assess whether a physician’s conduct falls outside the scope of professional practice, leading to more nuanced and varied interpretations.
• Increased Litigation: Physicians may challenge the DEA’s interpretations more frequently, resulting in more court cases and potentially more favorable outcomes for physicians.
• Potential for Inconsistent Rulings: Without uniform deference to the DEA, different courts might interpret these terms differently, leading to inconsistent rulings across jurisdictions.
• Narrower Scope of Enforcement: The DEA may face challenges in bringing enforcement actions based on its interpretations. Courts may require more concrete evidence that a physician’s actions were clearly outside professional norms.
• Need for Clearer Statutory Guidance: The DEA might push for legislative changes to provide clearer definitions and guidelines regarding controlled substance prescriptions.

Impact on DEA Administrative Decisions

The overturning of Chevron deference will also impact how DEA administrative agency decisions are reviewed and upheld. A recent Eleventh Circuit case, Suntree Pharmacy and Suntree Medical Equipment, LLC v. DEA, provides a good example of how Chevron deference has played a role in upholding DEA decisions.

In this case, the DEA revoked Suntree Pharmacy’s and Suntree Medical’s registrations to dispense controlled substances after finding that they filled prescriptions outside the usual course of practice and violated federal and state laws. The DEA's decision was based on substantial evidence, including testimony from experts about the red flags that the pharmacy ignored when filling prescriptions. The court upheld the DEA’s decision, citing the deference given to the agency’s expertise in interpreting and enforcing the Controlled Substances Act.

With Chevron deference overruled, such decisions will be subject to stricter judicial review. Courts will no longer automatically defer to the DEA’s interpretation of what constitutes a violation of the Controlled Substances Act or the corresponding responsibilities of pharmacists. Instead, courts will independently evaluate the evidence and the DEA's interpretation of the law, which could lead to different outcomes in similar cases.

For example, in the Suntree case, the DEA relied heavily on its interpretation of pharmacists’ responsibilities to identify and resolve red flags before dispensing controlled substances. Without Chevron deference, the court might have scrutinized this interpretation more closely, potentially requiring more concrete evidence that the prescriptions were illegitimate and that the pharmacists willfully ignored red flags.

The overturning of Chevron deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo marks a pivotal change for the DEA, physicians, and DEA administrative decisions. The DEA will operate under a new legal landscape with stricter judicial scrutiny of its interpretations, leading to significant changes in its regulatory and enforcement practices. This shift will also impact physicians, potentially leading to more litigation and varying interpretations of what constitutes lawful prescribing practices. Lastly, DEA administrative decisions will face closer judicial review, requiring the agency to provide more substantial evidence and clearer statutory guidance to support its actions.